

The Highest Good as the Kingdom of God: the role of Christianity in the Critique of Practical Reason

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Resumo:

A teoria moral kantiana geralmente é estudada com enfoque no imperativo categórico e em sua importância. Um conceito relevante para sua teoria moral que, todavia, é frequentemente negligenciado é o de sumo Bem. Tal conceito é importante para a concretização da moral kantiana e também por causa de seu papel na passagem da moral para a religião. Iniciamos com exposição sobre os postulados da razão prática pura (existência de Deus, imortalidade da alma e liberdade) em sua conexão com o primado da razão prática. Em seguida, discutiremos como Kant vincula seu conceito de sumo Bem com a concepção cristã de Reino de Deus, e também com o Reino da Graça de Leibniz. Em que medida Kant se apropria de teses cristãs clássicas e das leibnizianas? Até que ponto se distancia das mesmas?

Palavras-chave: Deus. Sumo Bem. Kant. Reino de Deus. Reino da Graça. Leibniz.

Abstract:

Kant's moral theory is often studied by focusing on the categorical imperative and its importance. An relevant concept of his morals which, however, is often neglected is the Highest Good. Such concept is important for the bringing about of Kantian morals and also because of its role on the passage from morals to religion. We begin with an exposition of the postulates of practical reason (existence of God, immortality of the soul and freedom) in its connection with the primacy of practical reason. Afterwards, we will discuss how Kant connects his notion of Highest Good with the Christian conception of Kingdom of God, and also with Leibniz's Kingdom of Grace. To which extent does Kant approach Leibnizian and classical Christian theses? And where does he set apart from them?

Keywords: God. Highest Good. Kant. Kingdom of God. Kingdom of Grace. Leibniz.

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Introduction

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant propose, an account on the highest Good (*böchstes Gut*), a necessary connection between virtue as a cause and happiness as an effect (Kant, *KpV* A 193-200)¹. Its bringing about (*Bewirkung*) in the world is the necessary object of a will that is determined by the moral law (Kant, *KpV* A 219). The moral law is Kant's principle of morality, which cannot be confused with a historical or cultural law, and it is intertwined with Kant's idea of freedom. We will dwell more on this on the next topic.

The will is a faculty of either producing objects that correspond to one's representations, or determining itself to effectuate them (Kant, *KpV* A 29). A will is a faculty of ends (*Vermögen der Zwecke*) (Kant, *KpV* A 103), by means of which a being is able to determine his desires by means of concepts, representing ends for himself. According to Herrero, the Kantian idea of end is the following: '(...) an end is something that, in order to become real, must have been previously intended. An end's representation precedes its reality' (Herrero, 1991, p. 39). The will is practical reason itself at use. The willing, as it is determined by sensible motives or motives from the understanding, is psychologically determined. When led by practical pure reason, *i. e.*, by itself, it follows the moral law, and it is considered a free will. (Eisler, 1994, p. 606).

All willing must have an end, even that not as a ground, but as a consequence. The idea of highest Good the final end (*Endzweck*) (Kant, *KpV* A 233) is grounded in the moral law and adds to it happiness, imposing the duty to produce an object worthy of utmost respect (Kant, *KpV* A 260ff): the highest Good. As finite rational beings, we possess a higher and a lower faculty of desire (*Begehrungsvermögen*) (Kant, *KpV* A 41), and its higher needs are higher ends of reason, *i. e.*, following the moral law and producing the highest Good. According to Beck, the difference between higher and lower faculty of desire comes from the scholastic distinction between *appetitus sensitivus* (passion) and *appetitus rationalis* (will) (Beck, 1963, p. 94).

¹ “KpV A” stands for the Originalausgabe version of the Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft), “KrV B” for second edition of the Originalausgabe version of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) and GMS stands for the Akademieausgabe version of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten).

The highest Good is a connection where virtue necessarily causes happiness, where the supreme good (virtue or the good will) produces happiness, resulting on the complete good (Kant, *KpV* A 198ff). According to Kant, a moral scenario in which one who acts morally is necessarily endowed with happiness is not a selfish demand or whim from a partial reason, but a necessary demand that even the impartiality of pure reason requires it (Kant, *KpV* A 198; A 223). It is the ‘final end’ reason can achieve. According to Georg Sans, the Kantian arguments on the highest Good are a critical way to resume the subject-matter of *Theodicy* (a term invented by Leibniz): history shows many examples that lead us to doubt not only of divine mercy, but also of divine justice. How can one admit that God is enough to assure the harmony between virtue and happiness? (Sans, 2012, pp. 271-280) Why does Kant approach the highest Good to the Kingdom of God and to Leibniz’ Kingdom of Grace? We shall discuss those issues in this paper.

The primacy of reason and the postulates of practical reason

Reason has a speculative/theoretical and a practical use. Speculative use of reason regards knowledge of objects, whereas practical use is directed to the determination of the will towards the final and complete end (Kant, *KpV* A 216). Practical reason has originary *a priori* principles (*ursprünglichen Prinzipien a priori*), for example: practical reason is the source of the moral law, which is valid *a priori*, *i. e.*, it logically precedes experience (Eisler, 1994, p. 38ff). Such principles are tied to certain theoretical propositions that are subtracted from knowledge of speculative reason (Kant, *KpV* A 216). Reason, in its theoretical employment, must assume propositions that inseparably belong to the practical interest of reason (*unnabtrennlich zum praktischen Interesse der reinen Vernunft gehören*).

Although I can’t affirm such propositions theoretically, neither can I refute them from the speculative point of view. Speculative reason receives the postulates as a strange offer to it (*ein ihr fremdes Angebot*); that did not come from its own soil, (*das nicht auf ihrem Boden erwachsen*), but is assured enough to accept them (Kant, *KpV* A 218). This means I can accept the postulates of pure practical reason, that are theoretical propositions (although indemonstrable as such) that stem from the moral law, which is valid *a priori* in an unconditional manner. (Kant, *KpV* A 221). The moral law itself is not a postulate, but a law by means of which pure reason determines the will (Kant, *KpV* A 238).

Speculative reason, in this case, must try to compare such propositions and connect them with its forces. It is not a matter of knowledge, but of practical extension of the employment of reason. Therefore, the bond between theoretical and practical reason is characterized by the primacy of practical pure reason (Kant, *KpV* A 218s). Such a tie is not contingent, but grounded *a priori* on reason – therefore, it is necessary. “All interest is, in the last instance, practical, and even the interest of speculative reason is conditioned, being only completed in its practical employment” (Kant, *KpV* A 218s). This accords to what Kant says in the *Groundwork*: practical judgments have an advantage over theoretical judgments, since in the former, it is advantageous for reason to go beyond the borders of experience (Kant, *GMS* 403f).

Hence, the highest Good is not an object of knowledge, but an object of the will which legitimates belief (*Glaube*) in objects which assist on the bringing about of the highest Good: freedom, immortality of the soul and the existence of God. These aren't objects of knowledge as well, but 'postulates of pure practical reason' which make up for man's inability to bring about the highest Good by himself (Kant, *KpV* A241ff).

There is no theoretical knowledge about the suprasensible, for Kant. It is only possible to believe in God and on immortality. Practical reason demands (*erfordert*) the acceptance of such objects that go beyond experience, which become in his philosophy the postulates of practical pure reason. The postulates are instruments that Kant conceives so in order can demonstrate the relation between morality and happiness in a proper fashion. “Pure rational faith”, likewise, is a form of conviction (*Überzeugung*) that is grounded on the moral disposition – it does not lie in a specific religious belief, but is a necessary development of one's moral disposition (Eisler, 1994, p. 205ff).

There can be no contradiction between belief and knowledge, for the domain of knowledge is the domain of the phenomena, and belief is related to what is beyond experience. The assumptions of belief are a need (“*Bedürfnis*”) of reason. (Eisler, 1994, p. 206ff). A need of reason in its practical use is pure rational faith (Kant, *KpV* A 227; 263). We accept it as a necessary hypothesis for the necessary bringing about of the highest Good to be possible. The postulates rise from the moral law and are objects of belief, and that is the reason why Kant had to, regarding the practical use of reason, to ‘deny knowledge in order to make room for faith’ (Kant, *KrV* B XXX). Pure rational faith (*reine Vernunftglaube*) is a way Kant encounters in order for morals not to be circumscribed within religion, but the other way around. Religious faith is born from the moral law, and morality is

independent, in its grounding, from faith, but leads to religion (Wood, 2006).

The final end (Endzweck) practical reason can desire to attain is the highest Good and, since it corresponds to what a will determined by the moral law wants, the attainment of it wants is prescribed as a duty (Kant, KpV A 214f). Such duty, however, is not possible to fulfill with human strength alone. Hence, Kant calls for the aforementioned ‘postulates of practical reason’, presuppositions necessary for the highest Good to be possibly attainable by mortal and finite beings. Such account was also present the Doctrine of Method of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, KrV B 823-859). Wood also states, regarding the Highest Good as final end, that

Kant’s most prominent use of the concept is a part of his argument for the practical rationality of moral faith in God, as the sole agency through which we can conceive the possibility of the highest good. But this does not mean that the highest good is not also seen by Kant as an object of human striving. As the sole conceivable final end, it is the sole end in which we can see the strivings of all well-disposed rational beings as united, and therefore it is the only conceivable end that can be universally shared by all human beings and regarded by them as a common end of all their strivings (insofar as these strivings accord with morality). (Wood, 1999, p. 313).

We are more close to Wood’s interpretation. A different one is Beck’s, who argues that hope in the highest Good is an incentive, but that it does not mean that it can become a determining ground of the will, for that would compromise the autonomy of the will. Beck believes the concept of highest Good is not compatible with Kant’s views on morality, being a dialectical ideal of reason, and not a practical concept (Beck, 1963, pp. 244-245). He also defends that the production of the highest Good is not a duty, which is noticeably a misinterpretation, as one can see based on a proper reading of Kant’s own arguments (Kant, KpV A 214f; 219; 227; 239; 256f; 259n).

Kant makes it clear that the point of view of the highest Good is necessary by respect towards the moral law (*Achtung fürs moralische Gesetz*), which is precisely the Kantian notion of duty (action by respect to the moral law). Producing the highest Good is a duty, which leads to concepts that couldn’t be solved by speculative reason, and are, from a practical point of view, taken as postulates of practical pure reason (Kant, KpV A 239). It is also worth noticing that Beck’s attempt at a reconstruction of the Kantian

argument for the highest Good reveals (Beck, 1963, p. 267-269) that he confuses virtue with holiness, and Kant makes it clear that the two are not the same (Kant, *KpV* A 151). A better understanding of Kant's ideas can be seen by philosophers such as Höhle:

Kant's contribution to natural theology is not limited to the destructive work done in *The Only Possible Argument* and in the *First Critique*. The *Critique of Practical Reason* introduces God as a postulate of practical reason (A 223ff.), and even if the epistemological status of this postulate is unclear and controversial, clearly Kant can claim to have given the moral argument for the existence of God a new foundation. This is linked to Kant's radical break with eudemonist ethics: the question of what our duty is cannot be reduced to the problem what makes us happy (Höhle, 2013, p. 46).

Indeed, Kant's purpose is not to reflect on how can one be happy, but on how can one be worthy of happiness, *i.e.*, virtuous, following the moral law. Morals is not a doctrine of happiness, but of how can we be worthy of happiness (Kant, *KpV* A 234; *GMS* 393). Moral law, by itself, does not promise (*verheißt*) happiness, and the Christian doctrine recognizes such need by representing a moral world, in which nature and morals harmonize, by means of a sacred Author. A Christian moral is not heteronomy, but autonomy of the will, since the moral motivation lies only in the representation of duty. (Eisler, 1994, p. 79).

The first of the aforementioned postulates of pure practical reason, freedom, is a necessary presupposition for us to be moral agents; otherwise we would be determined by the mechanism of nature (*Naturmechanismus*) alone (Kant, *KpV* A 53f.). According to Allison, freedom is a Kantian idea that is hard to interpret and to defend, since there are many different ways by which Kant characterizes it throughout his papers (transcendental freedom, moral freedom, free play between understanding and imagination, etc.) (Allison, 1990, p. 1). The reality of freedom is taken as a *Faktum* of pure reason (Kant, *KpV* A 56; A 72), or as a *Data* of pure reason (Kant, *KrV* B XXIf.; 830). This means "our common consciousness of the moral Law as supremely authoritative" (Allison, 1990, p. 230)".

The *Faktum* of pure practical reason is unverifiable. It describes the immediate consciousness of the moral law that 'forces itself' as a fact of pure reason. It is endowed with apodictic certainty, and such certainty does not come from a verifiable basis, but from the fact that we are *a priori* aware of it. (Caygill, 2000, p. 189). The fact of reason is not an empirical fact, but the only fact of pure reason, and it is inseparable from the moral law (Eisler, 1994, p. 152). According to Höhle, Kant's idea of the *Faktum* of pure

practical reason is one weakness on his moral theory, as well as his theory of the noumenon. Those two issues are limits that Kant's subjective idealism brings, according to Höhle (2003, p. 115, 119ff).

Beck explains that the moral law is an imperative to finite beings, which are not always spontaneously willing to do as pure practical reason prescribes them to (Beck, 1963, pp. 70-75). Freedom is the reason why the moral law has a meaning in this world, and the moral law is the means by which we can be aware of moral freedom, both in its positive and its negative use. Its negative use means being able to hinder the inclination's influence when it comes to accepting the moral law as sole criterion of morality, whereas its positive use it is the self-legislative activity of pure practical reason (Kant, *KpV* A 4n; 52ff).

However, freedom alone is not the sole determinant factor of our will. Since we also have a lower faculty of desire, we are also determined by our inclinations, united by the name of 'self-love' (*Selbstliebe*) (Kant, *KpV* A 38ff). The self-love is the sum of principles of personal happiness, in Kant's theory. And happiness is one's consciousness of the pleasantness of life, a state that lasts during the individual's life. So it is a state of consciousness, for Kant (Kant, *KpV* A 40). It is also described as satisfaction of one's inclinations (Kant, *KrV* B 834). Self-love is the principle of determination of a will that follows its inclinations, and the moral law is the principle of a determination of will that leads itself by means of the moral law.

By means of the moral law, which demands the highest Good in the world, the possibility of the ideas of God and immortality is postulated. Its existence is postulated, and with that nothing is theoretically known about the composition/nature or properties of the suprasensible. (Eisler, 1994, p. 427). God and a future life (*künftiges Leben*) are presuppositions that are inseparable from the moral law. Those two postulates are also grounded on the point of view of the intelligible world, *i. e.* the postulate of freedom (Kant, *KpV* A 238ff; Eisler, 1994, p. 555).

Kant finds it necessary that we adopt the idea of immortality of the soul, in order that we, mortal beings, can develop morally until we are up to the moral law's demand (Kant, *KpV* A 219ff). The biggest difficulty with the 'moral proof' of immortality regards the idea of a future life that progresses towards infinity. Allison says that "Kant could hardly claim that we need an eternity to become virtuous" (Allison, 1990, p. 172) and calls the Kantian argumentation "artificial in the extreme" (Allison, 1990, p.172). Nevertheless, we must be aware of the anthropological issue at stake in the Kantian argumentation: there is an anthropological limitation regarding us

being up to the moral law, and that makes special sense if we consider Kant's criticism to the Stoics and Epicureans (Kant, *KpV* A 198ff; 229f). The philosopher of Königsberg them (according to his interpretation of such schools, and not by means of a rigorous historical exegesis) for taking virtue and happiness as one and the same element, proceeding analytically, and not synthetically (Kant, *KpV* A 198-203).

Georg Sans notices that the doctrine of resurrection, or even of reincarnation, are present in many religions, but that is not the case with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, usually more tied to philosophical discussions (Sans, 2012, pp. 272). The postulate of the immortality of the soul seems to be quite different to the Christian faith, according to which death is the only last possible point to conversion. (Sans, 2012, pp. 276). So for Kant, is it possible to save one's soul after death? What we shall observe, on the following section, is how committed is Kant to the Christian faith with his postulate of the Existence of God.

The highest good, the kingdom of god and the kingdom of grace

Kant contrasts Christianity with pagan ethics such as Stoicism and Epicureanism (Kant, *KpV* A 229-233) defending that Christian ethics recognizes the limitations of human beings and recognize the need of divine assistance, being more compatible with the demands of practical reason. To the eyes of Kant, Christianity is the first doctrine to establish a difference between the principles of morality from those of happiness, recognizing the limits of human being and the shortage which leads to the necessity of God as able to unite the kingdoms of nature and morality (Düsing, 1971, pp. 12-13).

Christianity is considered symbolically and ethically by Kant, according to Eisler. The Christian morality offers a concept of highest Good that recognizes the rigorous demands of reason. The moral law demands a striving towards holiness and this battle towards it is called virtue (Eisler, 1994, p. 78). Düsing also discusses how close Kant's Idea of Highest Good is to problems already raised by Christian thinkers such as Augustine and Leibniz. (Düsing, 1971, p.18; p. 40).

Beiser also stresses this point (Beiser, 2006, p. 593-598). The latter also notices interesting features: the highest Good in Kant is not a secular conception; it is inseparable from the postulates of practical pure reason, and from the belief in God and on the immortality of the soul; the doctrine

of postulates approaches the matter of the connection between the noumenal and the phenomenal. (Beiser, 2006, p. 509).

Regarding the postulate of the existence of God, it arises from the situation according to which nature can't provide the necessary connection between nature and morality, but neither can the moral law alone (Kant, *KpV* A 224ff). We see many fair men suffer and criminals being happy, and in a contingent, not a necessary way. Hence, Kant defends it is necessary to presuppose an Author of Nature who is also a moral being, so he can commute between the realms of nature and morality with perfection, and this would be God.

God, from a practical point of view, can be conceived as a higher Intelligence and moral agent – therefore a being endowed with understanding and will. Kant stresses that God does not confuse himself with nature (Kant, *KpV* A 225) (possibly in order to evade an accusation of Spinozism). Since God is not a sensible being (Kant, *KpV* A 57ff), his will is holy, and he necessarily follows the moral law, therefore contributing to the highest Good. He distributes happiness proportionally to one's moral conduct (Kant, *KpV* A 225ff)

God is the original highest Good, and he is of necessary assistance in the production of the derivate highest Good (Kant, *KpV* A 226), to which Kant refers to as a secular translation of the “Kingdom of God” (*Reich Gottes*) (Kant, *KpV* A 230). And this is how morality leads to religion, and not the reverse path. Kant also uses the following expressions to refer to the (derivate) highest Good: “moral world” (Kant, *KrV* B 836); “the whole vocation of man (Kant, *KrV* B 868)”; “the moral destination of our nature” (Kant, *KpV* A 220); “Intelligible world” (Kant, *KpV* A 239); the “Kingdom of Grace”, bringing back Leibniz's expression (Kant, *KrV* B 840), and God's final end (*letzter zweck Gottes*) (Kant, *KpV* A 235).

It is also worth mentioning expressions such as “Kingdom of Morality” (*Reich der Sitten*) (Kant, *KpV* A 147), which will eventually agree with the “Kingdom of Nature” (*Reich der Natur*) resulting in the highest Good (Kant, *KpV* A 211). Habermas (2004, pp. pp. 461-465) discusses how, according to Kant, Christianity offers the representation of a moral world in which rational beings devote themselves to the moral Law and to the highest Good as a Kingdom of God. Caffarena, on the other hand, makes a more bold statement:

(...) Kant did not disconnect his autonomous ethics from religion. By means of an inversion of what was the usual order in Christian theological reflection, he believed to find God precisely on the autonomous ethical project of mankind (the ideal of the ‘Highest Good’, understood as the

maximal conjunction of ethical attitude with the realization of wishes which we call 'happiness'. That is the God of the Biblical-Christian tradition, here conceived by 'rational faith', as a 'postulate of practical reason', due to the necessity of not taking such an ideal as unrealizable. God is the 'Original Highest Good', archetype and guarantee of the project of the 'Derived Highest Good' (Caffarena, 2005, p. 474).

We agree with Caffarena that Kant considered religion compatible with his Christian ethics. But we believe that would be too far to equal Kant's God with the God of the Biblical-Christian tradition. Indeed, according to the Christian theology, there is only one God, creator of all things (Orígenes, 2012, p. 51). And Von Harnack explains the Kingdom of God as (a) a departure from selfish attitudes towards God. This departure, however, is not to be understood as an withdrawal from the religious and/or political community (von Harnack, 1961, p. 35). (b) The Kingdom is only possible with faith, (c) it is something that has already begun, but the task of its full realization is postponed to the future (von Harnack, 1961, pp. 44-45). So far, Kant's proposal seems quite close to a theological one, although from a practical point of view of reason.

However, in Christianity (d) there is the possibility of forgiveness of sins (von Harnack, 1961, p. 45) which, in Kantian terms, seems not to be present, since what is left is the 'purgatory' that the postulate of the immortality of the soul most likely entails. The dimension of Grace seems to be lost in Kant.

Most importantly, the role of Jesus as a mediator between men and God the founding of the Kingdom of God (von Harnack, 1961, p. 70s) is omitted in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It is worth noticing that Kant does not enter into specifications of the nature of God or of the soul, since practical pure reason is not endowed with this capacity, and theoretical reason cannot do this, since this would mean falling into dialectic illusion (Kant, *KrV* B 350-600ff).

It is also really worth noticing that Kant uses notions similar to the ones Leibniz uses, as Düsing remarks (1971, p. 18; p. 40). For example, in the *Monadology*, we have the idea of God as a being endowed with understanding and will (Leibniz, 1979b, §48). He is referred to as an Author of nature (Leibniz, 1979b, §65; § 83). Avoiding Spinozism, God is described as a being who does not confuse himself with nature (Leibniz, 1979b, § 72) (Kant, *KpV* A 225). Furthermore, the philosopher describes human spirits as forming a society with God (Leibniz, 1979b, §83; § 85), a moral world (Leibniz, 1979b, §86-7), or City of God, where we should spread as much

happiness according to a good will as possible (Leibniz, 1979a, §36). In the *New Essays*, Leibniz also names God nature's Author (Leibniz, 2000, Book II, Chapter XX, § 5).

According to Leibniz, the sufficient reason must be a necessary substance that determines all change and is called God (Leibniz, 1998, §8; 1979b, §§ 37-38). In God, there is unlimited power, understanding and will (Leibniz, 1979b, § 48). According to Kant, this kind of argument cannot come from the theoretical point of view, from the search of a necessary cause of change or movement, for example.

On the other hand, one can conceive God as a perfect being from a practical point of view (and only if out of a demand from the moral law – the production of the highest Good). God must be omniscient (*allwissend*) in order to know one's moral conduct, omnipotent (*allmächtig*) to attribute the due consequence's to one's moral behavior, and also omnipresent, eternal (*allgegenwärtig, ewig*, etc.) so that the 'reward' may be attributed to the ones who act fairly (Kant, *KpV* A 253)

The moral law determines, by means of the concept of highest Good, the concept of a supreme being, a task that physics and metaphysics were not able to fulfill. To Kant, therefore, the concept of God belongs to morals, and not to physics or metaphysics (Kant, *KpV* A 253), as is the case with Leibniz. Kant would also not agree with *design* arguments such as ones Leibniz uses (Leibniz, 1998, §§10-11).

What is close to the Leibnizian conception is the idea of a moral community in which there is no crime without punishment and no good deed without reward (Leibniz, 1998, §15). For Leibniz, this happens due not by means of an interference of God on nature, but by means of a pre-established harmony between the Kingdoms of nature and Grace, between God as an architect and God as a Monarch, between final causes and efficient causes, mechanicism and teleology, in such a fashion that nature leads to grace, and grace perfects nature (Leibniz, 1998, §15; 1979b, § 79, §87). A major difference would be that Kant does not enter the merit of how such a harmony occurs, although he defends some kind of harmony between laws of nature and laws of freedom, from the practical point of view (Kant, *KpV* A 261). The critical philosophy, however, does not enter the investigation of things in themselves. (Leibniz, 1979b, § 78).

It is interesting to notice that Leibniz criticizes the Stoics, supporting some kind of superiority of Christianity (Leibniz, 1998, §18), as we have seen something similar in Kant's writings. To sum up, Kant tries to read some of Leibniz concepts from a practical point of view, since he does not agree with Leibniz's strong speculative and teleological assertions

(Düsing, 1971, p. 40), which he would consider to be dogmatical. He also does not fully accept the Leibnizian doctrine of pre-established harmony, for it is deterministic and dogmatic in Kant's point of view.

Conclusions

The determination of the idea of the highest Good in a practically satisfactory manner is *the doctrine of wisdom (Weisheitslehre)*, and the one worthy of the name 'philosopher' is the one who pursues such wisdom (Kant, *KpV* A 194ff.). Such an idea has also had an influence on Kant's Philosophy of Religion, where the highest Good is also developed in the sense of a moral commonwealth. Kant's doctrine of postulates was not just meant to please his servant Lampe, as in the famous Heine anecdote, but it grew as a necessity of the fulfillment of Kant's moral theory, and not only out of a commitment of Kant towards Christendom.

This said, Christianity is of such importance in the *Critique of Practical Reason* that not only does Kant argue in its favor as a doctrine that acknowledges practical limits, but also one of its most important concepts is portrayed metaphorically as a "Kingdom of God" four times in this work (Kant, *KpV* A 125; A 230; A 231; A 235). We see Christianity as a doctrine that can, at least as Kant defends, be compatible with an autonomous moral doctrine. Maybe Kant underestimates the role of history in the Christian doctrine, and at least in the second *Critique* the role of Jesus is neglected. We also notice how Kant sympathizes with Christian anthropology, considering it more humble regarding human capacities than the Ancient Greek schools.

Kant does not enter in details of Christianity, partially because the critical philosophy does not allow a theoretical exam on the nature of God, on the soul, etc., as Christian theology does. The most he can offer is the practical postulation of some of these ideas that reason pursues, and finds its realization in its practical use. Important questions that lie ahead to us, based on the previous considerations, are the following: to which extent do Kant's metaphors correspond to a Christian thought? Does the Kingdom of God reach Kant's intent?

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